If you enjoyed our episode on "Truth, Pt. 1" and are interested in learning more about the topic, we would like to suggest some of the following readings (FYI – we do not necessarily endorse the positions advanced in the readings or videos we suggest):
QUICK CORRECTION: Jared misspoke in the episode when discussing Matthew’s Gospel. He mentioned that the title “Teacher/Rabbi” is important in the Gospel, which is true, but the scene in the Garden of Gethsemane where Judas Iscariot confronts Jesus plays on a different trope. Within Matthew’s Gospel, those outside of Jesus’ inner circle refer to him as Teacher/Rabbi (ῥαββί), but the disciples call him Lord (Kύριος). In the Last Supper scene in Matthew 26, Jesus tells the disciples that one of them will betray him, astonished, they each ask him, “It is not I, is it Lord?” (Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι, Κύριε;) Judas responds differently. He responds, “It is not I, is it Rabbi?” (Μήτι ἐγώ εἰμι, Ῥαββεί;) This is a conscious move on the part of Matthew’s author to thematically demonstrate Judas’ separation from the group. Later in the same chapter, when Judas betrays Jesus to the temple authorities, he addresses Jesus by saying, “Greetings, Teacher” (Χαῖρε, Ῥαββεί).
The Meaning of Knowledge: Crash Course Philosophy #7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kXhJ3hHK9hQ&list=PL8dPuuaLjXtNgK6MZucdYldNkMybYIHKR&index=8
Hilary Putnam discussing Theories of Truth:
Simon Blackburn – What is Truth Closer to Truth:
Alston, William P., 1996, A Realist Conception of Truth, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Austin, J. L., 1950, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 24: 111–129. Reprinted in Austin (1961a).
–––, 2018, “Deflationist truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 477–502.Baldwin, Thomas, 1991, “The identity theory of truth”, Mind, 100: 35–52.
–––, 2018, “Truth in British idealism and its analytic critics”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 125–149.
Beall, Jc, 2000, “On truthmakers for negative truths”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 264–268.
Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian (eds.), 2005, Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Blackburn, Simon and Simmons, Keith (eds.), 1999, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burgess, Alexis G. and Burgess, John P. (eds.), 2011, Truth, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cameron, Ross P., 2018, “Truthmakers”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 333–354.
Candlish, Stewart, 1999, “Identifying the identity theory of truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 99: 233–240.
Candlish, Stewart and Damnjanovic, Nic, 2018, “The identity theory of truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 255–282.
Cartwright, Richard, 1987, “A neglected theory of truth”, in Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 71–93.
David, Marian, 1994, Correspondence and Disquotation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2001, “Truth as identity and truth as correspondence”, in The Nature of Truth, M. P. Lynch (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 683–704.
–––, 2018, “The correspondence theory of truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 238–258.
Davidson, Donald, 1967, “Truth and meaning”, Synthese,17: 304–323. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
–––, 1969, “True to the facts”, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 748–764. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
–––, 1977, “Reality without reference”, Dialectica, 31: 247–253. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
–––, 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1986, “A coherence theory of truth and knowledge”, in Truth and Interpretation, E. Lepore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 307–319. Reprinted with afterthoughts in Davidson (2001).
–––, 1990, “The structure and content of truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 87: 279–328. Reprinted in revised form in Davidson (2005).
–––, 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2005, Truth and Predication, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Devitt, Michael, 1984, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.
Dodd, Julian, 2000, An Identity Theory of Truth, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Dummett, Michael, 1959, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141–162. Reprinted in Dummett (1978).
–––, 1976, “What is a theory of meaning? (II)”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. Reprinted in Dummett (1993).
–––, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1983, “Language and truth”, in Approaches to Language, Roy Harris (ed.), Oxford: Pergamon, 95–125. Reprinted in Dummett (1993).
Etchemendy, John, 1988, “Tarski on truth and logical consequence”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43: 51–79.
Field, Hartry, 1972, “Tarski’s theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 69: 347–375.
–––, 1986, “The deflationary conception of truth”, in Fact, Science and Value, C. Wright and G. MacDonald (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 55–117.
–––, 1994, “Deflationist views of meaning and content”, Mind, 103: 249–285.
Fox, John, 1987, “Truthmaker”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 188–207.
Glanzberg, Michael, 2003a, “Against truth-value gaps”, in Liars and Heaps, Jc Beall (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 151–194.
–––, 2018, "Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth/
–––, 2013, “The concept of truth”, in Companion to Donald Davidson, E. Lepore and K. Ludwig (eds.), Boston: Wiley-Blackwell, in press.––– (ed.), 2018, The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greenough, Patrick and Lynch, Michael P. (eds.), 2006, Truth and Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gupta, Anil, 1993, “A critique of deflationism”, Philosophical Topics, 21: 57–81.
Haack, Susan, 1976, “The pragmatist theory of truth”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27: 231–249.
Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hylton, Peter, 1990, Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Joachim, H. H., 1906, The Nature of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kaplan, David, 1989, “Demonstratives”, in Themes From Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 481–563. First publication of a widely circulated manuscript dated 1977.
King, Jeffrey C., 2018, “Propositions and truth-bearers”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 307–332.
Kirkham, Richard L., 1992, Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Künne, Wolfgang, 2003, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McDowell, John, 1976, “Truth-conditions, bivalence, and verificationism”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 42–66.
–––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Merricks, Trenton, 2007, Truth and Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Misak, Cheryl J., 2004, Truth and the End of Inquiry, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2018, “The pragmatist theory of truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 283–303.
Moore, George Edward, 1899, “The nature of judgment”, Mind, 8: 176–193.
Putnam, Hilary, 1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
–––, 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1985–86, “A comparison of something with something else”, New Literary History, 17: 61–79. Reprinted in Putnam (1994).
–––, 1994, Words and Life, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
–––, 1970, Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ray, Greg, 2018, “Tarski on the concept of truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 695–717.
Rorty, Richard, 1986, “Pragmatism, Davidson and truth”, in Truth and Interpretation, E. Lepore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 333–355.
Russell, Bertrand, 1903, Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, first edn.
–––, 1904, “Meinong’s theory of complexes and assumptions I, II, III”, Mind, 13: 204–219, 336–354, 509–524. Reprinted in Lackey (1973).
–––, 1910a, “The monistic theory of truth”, in Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin, 131–146.
–––, 1910b, “On the nature of truth and falsehood”, in Philosophical Essays, London: George Allen and Unwin,147–159.
–––, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press.
–––, 1956, “The philosophy of logical atomism”, in Logic and Knowledge, R. C. Marsh (ed.), London: George Allen and Unwin, 177–281. Originally published in The Monist in 1918.
Shieh, Sanford, 2018, “Truth, objectivity, and realism”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 433–476.
Soames, Scott, 1984, “What is a theory of truth?”, Journal of Philosophy, 81: 411–429.
–––, 1992, “Truth, meaning, and understanding”, Philosophical Studies, 65: 17–35.
Strawson, Peter F., 1949, “Truth”, Analysis, 9: 83–97.
–––, 1950, “Truth”, Aristotelian Society Supp.Vol., 24. Reprinted in Strawson (1971).
Szaif, Jan, 2018, “Plato and Aristotle on truth and falsehood”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 9–49.
Taylor, Barry, 1976, “States of affairs”, in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 263–284.
Vision, Gerald, 2004, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Walker, Ralph C. S., 1989, The Coherence Theory of Truth, London: Routledge.
–––, 2018, “The coherence theory of truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 219–237.
Williamson, Timothy, 1996, “Knowing and asserting”, Philosophical Review, 104: 489–523.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1922, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Woleński, Jan, 2001, “In defense of the semantic definition of truth”, Synthese, 126: 67–90.
Wright, Crispin, 1976, “Truth-conditions and criteria”, Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol., 50: 217–245. Reprinted in Wright (1993).
–––, 1982, “Anti-realist semantics: The role of criteria”, in Idealism: Past and Present, G. Vesey (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 225–248. Reprinted in Wright (1993).
–––, 1992, Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
–––, 1993, Realism, Meaning and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell, second edn.
–––, 1999, “Truth: A traditional debate reviewed”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24: 31–74
Young, James O., 2001, “A defense of the coherence theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 26: 89–101.